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Abstract
This article contains the Ninth John Whyte Memorial Lecture which discusses the Multi-Party
Negotiations, also known as the British-Irish agreement, which aimed to formalize the end of “The
Troubles” in Ireland.

THE NATURE OF THE AGREEMENT*
Brendan O'Leary**
INTRODUCTION
It is an academic, personal, and political honor to give the
Ninth John Whyte Memorial Lecture. It is an academic honor
because John Whyte was the most dispassionate of the interpreters of our conflict. In these respects and many others he is a
hard act to follow. His major survey, InterpretingNorthern Ireland,'
posthumously published in 1990, conveys his marvellous gifts of
clarity and concision in exposition. Commemorating John
Whyte comes with a warning: be clear. It is a personal honor to
give this lecture because John Whyte was one of my mentors as a
young academic. He was very helpful, very generous, and robust
in argument, as is his son, Nicholas.
This lecture is a belated act of homage to the Whyte family,
not least because Jean Whyte is here to hear it. She, like
Nicholas, is under no obligation to agree with my arguments,
but I do want to make one unfalsifiable claim. I think thatJohn
Whyte would have agreed with the analysis that follows. Lastly,
this is a political honor. John Whyte worried whether social scientific research on Northern Ireland was worthwhile, but contributed extensively and successfully to public deliberation in defiance of his occasional despair on this matter. He would have
been quietly pleased at the extent to which at least some social
* Text Accompanying the Ninth John Whyte Memorial Lecture, Nov. 26, 1998,
Queen's University of Belfast.
** Professor of Political Science, London School of Economics. This Essay draws
on, but significantly modifies, a series of articles written with Dr. Christopher McCrudden and Prof. John McGarry for the SUNDAY BUSINESS POST (Dublin), April 19 and 26
and May 3, 10, and 17, 1998. It also draws on two other articles by the author, The 1998British Irish Agreement: Power SharingPlus, published by the Constitution Unit (School of
Public Policy: UCL, London, 1998), and The 1998 British-IrishAgreement: Consociation
Plus, Scottish Affairs (in press). A United States Institute of Peace grant facilitated research. Thanks are especially owed to John McGarry and Chris McCrudden, and to
Katharine Adeney, Pia Chaudhuri, Prof. John Coakley, Prof. Walker Connor, Prof.
Conor Gearty, Prof. Robert Hazell, Prof. Donald Horowitz, Prof. David McCrone, Dr.
Tom Nairn, Dr. Mads Qvortrup, members of the Constitutional Unit at UCL, and multiple Irish and British public officials, politicians, and journalists who are too numerous
to be named here. The usual disclaimer applies.
1. JOHN WHYrE, INTERPRETING NORTHERN IRELAND (1990).

1628

THE NATURE OF THE AGREEMENT

1629

science, including political science, helped in the making of the
Agreement.
I. THE NAME OF THE AGREEMENT
The Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations 2 is
a major achievement, both for its negotiators and for the peoples of Ireland and Britain. To make it, many politicians, officials, paramilitaries, and ordinary citizens had been. through trials by ordeal. It emerged from a political desert whose only
landmarks were failed initiatives. Yet the Agreement that
emerged from that desert has no agreed name. It carries no person's name, British or Irish or American, and the names of no
roles, be they Prime Ministers, Taoisigh, Secretaries of State, Foreign Ministers, or Party Leaders. Some know it by the place that
it was made, as the Belfast Agreement, or, more controversially,
as the Stormont Agreement. Yet it was not signed by all of its
supporters in the final negotiating chambers, and it was actually
made in many places, including Dublin, London, and Washington; in smaller cities, towns and villages; and in airports, airplanes, airwaves, by mobile phone, and unofficial communications. Some just know it by its date: the April 10, 1998 Agreement, or the Good Friday Agreement. The former seems too
limited, while the latter, gives too much credit to Christianityboth as a source of resolution and as a cause of conflict.
It is also known as the British-Irish Agreement, after the
peoples who confirmed it in referendums in both parts of Ireland-though strictly speaking only the British in Ireland as well
as the Irish in Ireland were asked to ratify it. I prefer to call it
the British-Irish Agreement. This name reflects the importance
of the fact that the Agreement is the fulfilment of a previous
Agreement, known as the Anglo-Irish Agreement.' We Irish and
British know that much resides in names, and so to avoid giving
any further offense to anyone's sensibilities, I will refer to it simply as the Agreement.
2. Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, Apr. 10, 1998 [hereinafter
Agreement].
3. Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Ireland, Nov. 15, 1985,
U.K.-Ir., Cmnd. 9657, reprinted in TOM HADDEN & KEVIN BOYLE, THE ANGLO-IRiSH AGREEMENT 15-48 (1989) [hereinafter Anglo-Irish Agreement].
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II. THE INSTITUTIONAL NATURE OF THE AGREEMENT
What kind of Agreement is it? What is its nature? It is not
an example of "the third way," as Charles Leadbetter recently
argued at the feet of Tony Blair. It is much more interesting
than a courtier's claims. The correct answer for a student of
political science, as John Whyte would have recognized, is that it
is a consociational agreement. In other words, it is a political
arrangement that meets all four of the criteria laid down by that
doyen of political science, the Dutchman Arend Lijphart: crosscommunity executive power-sharing, proportionality rules applied throughout the relevant governmental and public sectors,
community self-government or autonomy and equality in cultural life, and veto rights for minorities.4
A consociation is an association of communities. In this
case, the communities are British unionist, Irish nationalist, and
others. A consociation can be created without any explicit consociational theory to guide it, and indeed that has often happened.5 More often consociations are the outcomes of bargains
or pacts between the political leaders of ethnic or religious leaders. The Agreement is the product of tacit and explicit consociational thought,6 and of bargaining, or of what is sometimes
called pacting.
4. See, e.g.,

DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES (1977); MICHAEL
(1997).
5. Lijphart claims that consociational rules were created by Dutch politicians in
1917, Lebanese politicians in 1943, Austrian politicians in 1945, Malaysian politicians in
1955, Colombian politicians in 1958, Indian politicians in the 1960s and 1970s, South
African politicians in 1993-1994, and by British politicians addressing Northern Ireland
in 1972. One does not have to agree with the citation of any or all of these cases to
accept Lijphart's point that politicians are more than capable of doing theory without
the aid of theorists. See, e.g., Arend Lijphart, Foreword: One Basic Problem, Many Theoretical Options-And a PracticalSolution?, in THE FUTURE OF NORTHERN IRELAND at viii (John
McGarry & Brendan O'Leary eds., 1990); James Currey, Prospectsfor Power-Sharing in the
New South Africa, in ELECTION '94 SOUTH AFRICA: THE CAMPAIGNS, RESULTS AND FUTURE
PROSPECTS 221-33 (Andrew Reynolds ed., 1994); Arend Lijphart, The Puzzle of Indian
Democracy: A ConsociationalInterpretation,2 AM. J. POL. ScI. 258 (1996).
6. One of the makers of the Agreement, Dr. Mowlam, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Northern Ireland since 1997, has an academic consociational heritage.
She wrote about Swiss federal and consociational practices in her educational career,
and at least one of her advisors has had an abiding interest in the subject. Consociational thinking not only formed part of the background thinking of the United Kingdom Labour Party. It had an impact on the drafting of the Framework Documents of
1995. The novel executive formation in the Agreement, based on the d'Hondt rule,
reflects consociational coalition principles used elsewhere in Europe and in the European Parliament.
AREND LtIPHART,

WALZER, ON TOLERATION
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The Agreement, however, is not just consociational. It also
departs from Lijphart's prescriptions in important respects that
have practical implications for Northern Ireland and for regulating ethnic and national conflict elsewhere. It is a consociational
agreement with important external dimensions. It is one made
with national and not just ethnic or religious communities, and
it is one endorsed by both leaders and the led.
To be formulaic, the Agreement establishes an internal consociation built within overarching confederal and federal institutions. It has imaginative elements of co-sovereignty, and it
promises a novel model of double protection. It rests on a bargain derived from mutually conflicting hopes about its likely
long-run outcome, but that may not destabilize it. One supplement must be added to this already lengthy formula, the fact
that the Agreement is vulnerable both to post-Agreement bargaining and to legalism.
III. THE FOUR CONSOCIATIONAL ELEMENTS
A. Executive Power Sharing
At the heart of any consociational arrangement is executive
power sharing. The Agreement establishes two semi-presidential
figures in a devolved Northern Assembly-a First Minister and a
Deputy First Minister. Once elected, they have presidential characteristics because it is almost impossible to depose them until
the next general election. Presidentialism means an executive
that cannot be destroyed by an assembly except through impeachment.
Let me make this clear through a currently relevant illustration. Even if David Trimble's party colleagues were to vote unanimously to depose him from the leadership of the Ulster Unionist Party ("UUP"), he could not be forced to resign his position
as First Minister. That could happen only if enough nationalists
collude with enough unionists to enforce it. To do that, however, nationalists in the Assembly would have to bring down their
own Deputy First Minister. This is a fact because the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister are elected together by the parallel consent cross-community consent procedure (see Appendix
One). This procedure requires them to have the support of fifty
percent of registered nationalists and unionists as well as a majority of the Assembly. Critically, this rule gives very strong in-
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centives to unionists and nationalists to nominate a candidate
for one of these positions that is acceptable to at least a majority
of the other bloc's members in the Assembly. So even if in the
future Gerry Adams leads Sinn F6in into surpassing the SDLP in
seats won in the Assembly, unionists will be able to block his
nomination as Deputy Chief Minister. Likewise, nationalists can
veto an unacceptable hard-line unionist.
In the first elections for these posts, pro-Agreement unionists in the UUP and the Progressive Unionist Party voted solidly
for the combination of David Trimble of the UUP and Seamus
Mallon of the SDLP. Naturally, so did the SDLP. Sinn Fin deliberately abstained to avoid the First and Deputy First Ministers
being chosen by more nationalists than by unionists-an outcome that might have endangered Trimble's status with the
unionist public, and a sign of Sinn Fin's maturing avoidance of
provocation.
The rules practically ensure that a unionist and a nationalist
share the top two posts. The Agreement makes it clear that both
posts have identical symbolic and external representation functions. Indeed, both posts have identical powers, and their only
real difference is in their titles. Both, for example, will preside
over the Executive Committee of Ministers and have a role in
coordinating its work. The Agreement does not make it clear
whether the two will have any of the existing departmental responsibilities in Northern Ireland, though it might make sense
for them to runjointly and be served by the existing Finance and
Personnel Ministry.7
With one notable exception that I will discuss in a moment,
David Trimble and Seamus Mallon have successfully and carefully co-ordinated' their statements and actions since their joint
election, especially in the management of the Drumcree crisis in
the first two weeks of July 1998. They are showing how this new
diarchy will critically depend upon the personal cooperation of
the two holders of these posts. The Northern Ireland Act of
1998 ("Northern Ireland Act"), which has just gone through
Westminster's last procedures, has reinforced their interdependence by requiring that "if either the First Minister or the deputy
First Minister ceases to hold office, whether by resignation or
7. The Northern Ireland Act makes it plain that the top two Ministers can hold
functional portfolios. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, ch. 47, § 16 (Eng.).

1999]

THE NATURE OF THE AGREEMENT

1633

otherwise, the other shall also cease to hold office."' The one
major exception to the pattern of dyarchic cooperation has
arisen over the implementation of the rules for executive formation. Indeed, as I speak, we have a crisis of executive formation.
Unlike some Presidents and most Prime Ministers, neither
the First Minister nor the Deputy First Minister formally appoint
the other Ministers to the Executive Committee. Instead, under
the plain meaning of the Agreement, these posts should be allocated to parties in proportionto their strength in the Assembly,
according to a mechanical rule called the d'Hondt rule (see Appendix Two). The rules are simple in their consequences. Any
party that wins any significant share of seats and is willing to
abide by the Agreement has a reasonable chance of access to the
executive. This is a subtle form of what Lijphart calls grand coalition government, though it is a coalition government without a
coalition agreement.
This is how it should work in law. The d'Hondt rule means
that parties get the right to nominate Ministers according to
their respective strength in seats, and there is no vote of confidence required by the Assembly. It also means that parties get to
choose, in order of their strength, their preferred ministries. An
individual Minister can be deposed from office by cross-community rules (see Appendix One), but the party that held the relevant Ministry will be able to appoint his or her successor from
amongst its ranks. Parties, of course, have the right to refuse a
Ministry to which they are entitled and may voluntarily exclude
themselves from their automatic right to a share in executive
power.
The current crisis of executive formation has arisen for
political and constitutional reasons. Politically, it has arisen because David Trimble has insisted that Sinn Fain must deliver
some IRA decommissioning before its members can take seats in
the Executive Committee. Under the Agreement, he has no
constitutional warrant to exercise this veto. The Agreement
does not require prior decommissioning on the part of any
paramilitaries or of any parties connected to them, though it
does require the completion of decommissioning by May 22,
2000.
Trimble has been given the opportunity to exercise this un8. Id. § 16(7).
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constitutional veto, which has led to a breach in the formal requirements of the Agreement. This breach has been created because the SDLP did not make immediate executive formation a
condition of its support for the Mallon-Trimble ticket for Deputy
First Minister and First Ministers. The SDLP failed to do so because it wished to shore up Trimble's political position. The
price has so far been rather high, and it has yet to be repaid.
One flexible provision in the Agreement has given Trimble
room for this maneuver. The Agreement states that there must
be at least six other Ministers, but that there can be up to ten.
The number of ministries are to be decided by cross-community
consent, presumably after the First and Deputy First Ministers
agree on a proposal. That has given Trimble the opportunity to
delay on executive formation. The more Ministries there are in
the Executive Committee then the more proportional the representation of parties on the Executive. The UUP has been holding out for a seven seat Executive, under which unionists would
have an overall majority. The SDLP is holding out for a larger
Executive (see Appendix Two).
Imagine for the moment that the crisis of executive formation is eventually resolved. How will the Executive Committee
work? Individual ministers will enjoy executive powers under existing U.K. legislation and can operate without collective responsibility, except where the Executive Committee and the Assembly
have agreed on a broad program and where they are obliged to
engage in cross-departmental activities. No method of reaching
agreement within the Executive Committee is specified, though
the program must enjoy cross-community support in the Assembly. In practice, agreements within the Executive minimally will
require majority support, including the agreement of the First
and Deputy First Ministers.
In short, the consociational criterion of cross-community executive power sharing is clearly met in the Agreement. There
are, though, special features of the new arrangements that differ
from previous consociational experiments in Northern Ireland
and elsewhere. Ministers will take a Pledge of Office, not an
Oath of Allegiance. This bi-nationalism is at the heart of the
Agreement. Nationalist ministers do not have to swear an Oath
of Allegiance to the Crown or the Union. The Pledge requires
Ministers to discharge their duties in good faith, to follow exclusively peaceful and democratic politics, to participate in prepar-
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ing a program of government, and to support and to follow the
decisions of the Executive Committee and the Assembly.
The duties of office include a requirement to serve all the
people equally, to promote equality, and to prevent discrimination. This means, according to the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, that civil servants will be bound to run their departments consistent with these obligations. The duties of office also
include a requirement that the relevant Ministers serve in the
North/South Ministerial Council. This duty,, in conjunction
with other clauses, will prevent parties opposed to this aspect of
the Agreement from taking Ministerial office in good faith.
How should we appraise the executive design that is at the
heart of the Agreement? The special skill of the designers is that
they have created strong incentives for executive power sharing
and power division but without requiring parties to have a formal coalition agreement. In these respects, the Agreement differs from the Sunningdale experiment of 1973. What some makers of the Agreement did not foresee, though, was that failure to
timetable the formation of the rest of the executive immediately
after the election of the First and Deputy First Ministers could
precipitate a protracted crisis of executive formation.
Amendments to the Northern Ireland Act of 1998 could be
adopted by the U.K. Parliament or the Northern Ireland Assembly. Such an adoption would be consistent with the Agreement
as it would prevent any recurrence of this type of crisis. In the
future, candidates for First Minister and Deputy First Minister
could be obliged to state the number of executive portfolios that
will be available in the Executive Committee, and the formation
of that Committee should be required within a week. Otherwise,
the election of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister
should be rendered null and void. That would plug this particular constitutional hole. It may, however, be unnecessary. It is
not likely that any future candidates for First Minister or Deputy
First Minister will agree to be nominated without a firm agreement from their opposite number on the number of portfolios
and the date of cabinet formation.
B. Proportionality
Consociational arrangements are built on principles of proportionality. The Agreement meets this test in three clear ways,
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in the executive in the manner that I have discussed (see also
Appendix One), in the elections to the Assembly, and in public
sector positions. All future elections to the 108-member Assembly will use a proportional representation system, the single
transferable vote ("STV") in six-member constituencies. The Assembly, though, may choose by cross-community consent procedures to advocate change from this system later. The Droop
quota in each constituency is therefore 14.3% of the vote, which
squeezes the very small parties or alternatively encourages them
to form electoral alliances.9
Thus, the smaller of the two loyalist parties, the Ulster Democratic Party ("UDP") led by Gary McMichael, won no seats in
the first Assembly election. Conceivably, the rival loyalist parties,
the PUP and the UDP, may see the need to coalesce in the future to achieve better representation. Very small parties that can
gather lower order preferences from across the unionist and nationalist blocs, such as the Women's Coalition, have shown that
the system need not preclude representation for small parties
among the "Others."
This system of voting is not what Lijphart recommends for
consociational systems. Lijphart is instead an advocate of partylist PR systems because he believes that they help make party
leaders more powerful and better able to sustain inter-ethnic
consociational deals. Those who would like to see David Trimble in greater control of his party might covet this form of proportional representation. If, however, a region-wide list system
had been in operation in June of 1998, then the UUP would
have ended up with fewer seats, as well as less seats than the
SDLP. The STV, moreover, has the great merit of encouraging
"vote-pooling."1 In principle, voters can use their transfers to
reward pro-Agreement candidates at the expense of anti-Agreement candidates.1 1 Some of the SDLP's and Sinn F6in's voters,
then, have found it advantageous to reward David Trimble's
Ulster Unionist Party for making the Agreement by giving its
candidates their lower-order preferences. In this way, they
9. The Droop quota used in single transferable vote ("STV") is (Total Vote/N+1) +
1, where N = Number of Assembly members to be elected.
10. DONALD HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT 628 (1985).
11. This option is also open to anti-Agreement voters, but DUP and UKUP voters
are unlikely to give their lower order preferences to Republican Sinn F6in should that
party ever to choose to stand for elections.
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helped the Ulster Unionist Party defeat Ian Paisley's DUP and
Robert McCartney's UKUP. 1 2
Tables One and Two illustrate the outcome of the June,
1998, elections to the first Assembly under the Agreement. The
proportionality of the results is evident, both with respect to
blocs and with respect to parties. The deviations in seats won
compared to the first preference vote benefited primarily the
pro-Agreement parties. Candidates of such parties gathered support through the transfers of lower order preferences.
The UUP was the principal beneficiary of the transfer of
lower order preferences, taking its seat share (25.9%) significantly above its first-preference vote share (21.3%). These lower
order preferences, however, came from voters who voted both
for and against the Agreement. The Northern Ireland Women's
Coalition was the most widespread beneficiary of lower-order
preferences, winning two seats despite a very low first-preference
vote share. The transfers by voters to the pro-Agreement candidates, though not as significant as had been hoped, performed
one very important task. They converted a bare anti-Agreement
majority of the first preference vote (25.5%) within the unionist
bloc of voters into a bare pro-Agreement majority (27.7%)
amongst seats won by unionists, a result that was essential for the
stabilization of the Agreement.
Proportionality rules, combined with accommodative incentives, do not stop with the executive, the committee system in the
Assembly, or with the electoral system. The Agreement is consistent with past and future measures to promote fair employment
and affirmative action in the public sector that will, one hopes,
eventually ensure a proportional and non-discriminatory civil
service and judiciary.
The Agreement also envisages a representative police force.
It is the task of the Independent Commission on policing,
headed by former Hong Kong Governor Christopher Patten, to
ensure the creation of a police service that is representative of
Northern Ireland. The RUC's mono-national culture, and in12. The STV system has arguably helped encourage Sinn F~in to its current path.
In the past, it won over few supporters from other parties. Since the early 1990s, that is
no longer true because SDLP voters have been rewarding Sinn F~in for its increased
moderation. STV also has the great merit of having been used in Northern Ireland for
local government elections since 1973, and European Parliamentary elections since
1979, so voters do not need to learn a new system.
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deed its monopoly on policing services, must end if the Agreement is to be fully consistent with a consociational model.
Democratic consociation cannot exist where those of military age in one community are almost the sole recruitment pool
to police all of those in another community. A fully representative and preferably two-tier model of federal and democratic policing is the best way to ensure that proportional policing supplements the other political institutions of the Agreement.1"
C. Communal Autonomy and Equality
Consociational settlements avoid the compulsory integration of peoples. Instead, they seek to manage differences equally
and justly. To be liberal, such settlements must also protect
those who wish to have their identities counted differently as well
as those who do not want to be identified by collective identities.
The Agreement leaves in place the new arrangements for
schooling in Northern Ireland in which Catholic, Protestant,
and integrated schools are to be equally funded. In this respect,
Northern Ireland is fully consociational and liberal. Only the
very small minorities of non-Christian religious believers (less
than one percent of the population) lack full and equal funding,
and it would be generous and just to make such provisions for
them where numbers permit. The Agreement also makes new
provisions for the educational use, protection, and public use of
the Irish language, along the lines used for Welsh in the United
Kingdom. It therefore adds linguistic protections to educational
protections of Irish nationalist culture.
Most importantly, the Agreement completes the equalization of both major communities as national communities. Specifically, the Agreement refers to British and Irish communities
and not just, as is so misleadingly said, to Protestants and
Catholics. The European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("European Convention on Human Rights"), which is weak on the protection of collective rights and equality rights, will be supplemented by measures that will give Northern Ireland its own tailor-made Bill of
Rights, to protect both national groupings as well as individuals.
The worst illusion of parties to the conflict and some of its suc13. See JOHN McGARRY & BRENDAN O'LEARY, POLICING NORTHERN IRELAND:
(1999).

STRUCTIVE PROPOSALS

CON-
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cessive managers, based in London, Belfast, or Dublin, was the
belief that Northern Ireland could be stable and democratic
while being either British or Irish. The Agreement makes
Northern Ireland bi-national and opens up the prospect of a fascinating jurisprudence, not least in the regulation of parades
and marches.
The Agreement does not neglect the non-national dimensions of local politics, nor does it exclude the "Others" from
what I have heard described in Alliance party circles as a squalid
communal deal. All aspects of unjustified social equalities, as
well as inequalities between the national communities, are recognized in the text of the Agreement, and given some means of
institutional redress and monitoring. The Agreement addresses
national equality, the allegiances to the Irish and British nations,
and social equality. In other words, it addresses other dimensions that differentiate groups and individuals in Northern Ireland, such as religion, race, ethnic affiliation, sex, and sexuality.
Equality issues, be they national or social, are not left exclusively to the local parties to manage and to negotiate, which
might be a recipe for stalemate. Instead, the U.K. Government
has signalled its intention to create a new statutory obligation on
public authorities. They will be required to carry out all their
functions with due regard to the need to promote equality of
opportunity in relation to people's religious background and
political opinions. They will be required also to promote equality with respect to people's gender, race, disabilities, age, marital
status, and sexual orientation. This commitment entails what
Dr. Christopher McCrudden labels mainstreaming equality. The
U.K. Government is also likely to establish a Human Rights Commission tasked with an extended and enhanced role, including
monitoring, promoting litigation, and drafting a tailor-made Bill
of Rights for Northern Ireland.
D. Minority Veto Rights
The final dimension of a consociational settlement is the
protection of minorities through giving them veto rights. The
Agreement fulfills this criterion in the Assembly, in the courts,
and through enabling political appeals to both the U.K. and
Irish Governments.
The Assembly has cross-community procedures, including
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parallel consent, weighted majority, and petition procedures
(see Appendix One) that protect nationalists from unionist
dominance. Indeed, they do so in such a comprehensive manner that before the election of the First and Deputy First Ministers, there were fears that the rules designed to protect the nationalist minority might be used by hard-line unionist opponents
of the Agreement to disable its initiation and to destroy its development.
This possibility remains alive but is somewhat diminished
because the weighted majority rule requires a lower level of
unionist consent than was required for the election of the First
and Deputy First Ministers. The "Others" are less protected in
the Assembly. They can, for instance, be outvoted by a simple
majority and any nationalist-unionist super-majority. In addition, their numbers leave them well short of being able to trigger
a petition on their own. The "Others," however, have not been
at the heart of the conflict. It is therefore not surprising if they
are not at the heart of the resulting pacts, though it is not accurate to claim that they are excluded from the Agreement.
In the courts, the "Others," disaffected nationalists, and
unionists will have means to redress breaches of their human
and collective rights. The content of the European Convention
on Human Rights is well-known. What is less clear is what package of collective rights the new independent Northern Ireland
Rights Commission will recommend. What has also not been addressed directly and immediately is the composition of the local
judiciary. The Agreement provides for a review of the criminal
justice system that will include "arrangements for making appointments to the judiciary."14 It will, however, be of great importance that the judiciary reflects the different communities in
the North and is committed to the human and minority rights
provisions that it will increasingly interpret.
Other non-national minorities have not been forgotten. In
the Civil Society Forum to be created in the North with a Southern counterpart, and through the Inter-Governmental Conference of the British and Irish Governments, mechanisms have
been established to ensure that the "Others" will be able to express their voices and to ensure that the new rights culture does
14. Agreement, supra note 2, Policing and Justice, Annex B: Review of the Criminal Justice System, Terms of Reference.
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not exclude them. It would be helpful if progress in establishing
these forums were expedited.
IV. CONFEDERAL AND FEDERAL ELEMENTS OF
THE A GREEMENT
The Agreement is not only internally consociational, but it
is also confederalizing and federalizing. This meshing of internal and external institutions highlights it as novel in comparative
politics. Let me make it plain why I regard the Agreement as
both confederalizing and federalizing, though my emphasis is
on the former.
Confederations exist when sovereign jurisdictions voluntarily delegate powers and functions to bodies that can exercise
power across all jurisdictions. I believe that the Agreement creates two new confederal relationships. I also believe that the
Agreement -has subtle federalist dimensions if we agree that a
federation exists when there are at least two separate tiers of government over the same territory and when neither tier can unilaterally alter the constitutional capacities of the other.
A. The All-Ireland Confederal Relationship
The Agreement creates a new confederal relationship that is
all-Ireland in nature-the North/South Ministerial Council.
When established, it will bring together those with executive responsibilities in Northern Ireland and in the Republic. It will be
established after the Assembly has come into being and completed a program of work to establish the Council. The specific
deadline for that body of work to be agreed on passed on October 31, 1998. That date passed without an agreement because
no executive has been formed in Northern Ireland to engage
with its counterpart in the Republic.
Consequently, the signatories to the Agreement are now in
breach of their treaty obligations. This breach opens the entire
Agreement to constitutional challenge in the Republic, enabling, in extremis, any aggrieved citizen to argue for the retention of the old Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution on the
grounds that the United Kingdom is in breach of its treaty obligations.
What is intended by the Agreement is clear. Nationalists
were concerned that if the Assembly could outlast the North/
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South Council, it would provide incentives for unionists to undermine the latter. Unionists, by contrast, worried that if the
Council could survive the destruction of the Assembly, nationalists would seek to bring this about. The Agreement is a tightly
written contract with penalty clauses. Internal consociation and
external confederalism go together; the Assembly and the Council are mutually interdependent, meaning that one cannot function without the other. Unionists cannot destroy the Council
while retaining the Assembly, and nationalists cannot destroy the
Assembly while keeping the Council.' 5 If the Assembly does not
create the Council, then it will effectively destroy itself, enabling,
in extremis, any aggrieved citizen in Northern Ireland to argue for
the suspension of the Northern Assembly until the North/South
Ministerial Council is established.
The North/South Ministerial Council is the means by which
nationalists hope to persuade unionists of the attractions of Irish
unification. In addition, it will satisfactorily link northern nationalists to their preferred nation state. Consistent with the
Agreement, the Irish Government has agreed to change its constitution to ensure that the North/South Ministerial Council will
be able to exercise island-wide jurisdiction in those functional
activities where unionists are willing to cooperate.
The North/South Ministerial Council will function much
like the Council of Ministers in the European Union, with ministers having considerable discretion to reach decisions but remaining ultimately accountable to their respective legislatures.
The Council will meet in plenary format twice a year, and in
smaller groups to discuss specific sectors (say, agriculture, or education) on a regular and frequent basis.
Provision is also made for the Council to meet to discuss
matters that cut across sectors and to resolve disagreements. In
addition, the Agreement provides for cross-border or all-island
15. The Agreement does not mention what happens if both institutions and thus
the Agreement itself collapses. This author's opinion is that Northern Ireland would be
governed, as at present, by the British government with input from Dublin through the
British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference. The two governments would likely pursue
the promotion of equality of esteem, reductions in the employment gap between
Catholics and Protestants, and the reform of policing. Eventually, there would be a
shift towards direct co-sovereignty over the region. If the Agreement's core institutions
are not established, then any legal challenge to the implementation of changes to Articles 2 and 3 of the Republic's Constitution is likely to be successful. Unionists opposed
to the Agreement would do well to bear these considerations in mind.
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implementation bodies, meaning the same as executive. These
bodies are to be responsible for implementing decisions taken in
at least six as yet unspecified areas. These areas were to be
agreed on during a transitional period between the Assembly
elections and October 31, but are currently under discussion.
The Agreement provides an Annex that lists twelve possible areas for implementation.
The North/South Ministerial Council differs from the
Council of Ireland of 1974, and not just in name. There is no
provision for a North/South joint parliamentary forum, as there
was in the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973. The Northern Assembly and the Irish Oireachtas,"a however, are asked to consider
developing such a forum. Nationalists wanted the North/South
Ministerial Council to be established by legislation from Westminster and the Oireachtasin order to emphasise their autonomy
from the Northern Assembly. Unionists preferred that the
Council be established by the Northern Ireland Assembly and its
counterpart in Dublin. The document produced on April 10,
1998, split the differences between the two positions.
The North/South Council and the implementation bodies
are to be brought into existence by British-Irish legislation. During the transitional period now extended beyond October 31, it
is for the Northern Ireland executive and the Republic's government to agree how cooperation should take place and in what
areas the North/South institutions should cooperate. Once this
body of work is agreed on, the Northern Ireland Assembly will
be unable to change it unless both communities there consent.
The question of what scope and powers these North/South
institutions will have remains to be decided. Some of this was
supposed to have been already decided by October 31, 1998.
The Agreement does, however, require a meaningful Council. It
states that the Council will, rather than may, identify at least six
matters, where existing bodies will be the appropriate mechanisms for cooperation within each separate jurisdiction. The
Agreement also identifies at least six matters where cooperation
will take place through cross-border or all-island implementation
bodies. The Agreement also links Ireland, North and South, to
another confederation, the European Union. It requires the
16. This is the collective name in Gaelic for the two chambers of the Irish Parliament. Dail Eireann and Seanad Eireann.
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Council to consider the implementation of EU policies and programs as well as proposals under way at the European Union and
makes provisions for the Council's views to be taken into account at relevant EU meetings.

The signatories to the Agreement have promised to work in
good faith to create the North/South Ministerial Council.
There has not been sufficient good faith to prevent the first material break in the timetable scheduled in the Agreement. The
signatories are required to use best endeavours to reach agreement and to make determined efforts to overcome disagreements in functions where there is a mutual cross-border and allisland benefit.
The crisis over executive formation may have prolonged

consequences. The Agreement explicitly envisaged a timetable
that would have enabled an interim Northern executive to establish itself and enabled it to make binding agreements with the
Republic's ministers. Once North/South cooperation was
agreed, any future unionist majority in the Assembly would not
be able formally to block it, since any scaling back of the Council's powers would require the consent of both nationalists and
unionists.1 7 Nationalists are beginning to fear that the crisis of
executive formation will throw the entire content of North/
South cooperation open to the veto of both "No" Unionists and
soft-"Yes" Unionists in the Assembly, which is due to have a full
life in February.
But again, let us imagine that this crisis is eventually over17. The possibility of a Unionist Minister refusing to serve on the Council will
appear to some as very grave, given that Unionist parties that oppose the Agreement,
especially the DUP, are in principle eligible for ministerial portfolios. This, however, is
ruled out in practice. Participation in the North/South Ministerial Council has been
made an essential responsibility attaching to relevant posts in the two administrations.
Relevant posts are, presumably, any portfolio a part of which is subject to North/South
cooperation. This leaves open the possibility that a politician opposed to the North/
South Ministerial Council might take a seat on it with a view to wrecking it. Ministers,
though, are required to establish the North/South Institutions in good faith and to use
best endeavours to reach agreement. Because these requirements are presumably subject to judicial review, it is unlikely that potential wreckers, like Ian Paisley or Peter
Robinson, would be able to take part in the North/South Ministerial Council, even if
they wanted to. One of the requirements for membership of the Executive is that ministers must "support ... all decisions of the Executive Committee," and they can be
removed if they do not show such support. Removal, though, presupposes decisions
being made by the Executive Committee. Whether these provisions will be justiciable
remains to be seen.
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come. If that happens, then several current facts will support
the new constitutional confederalism. As the Republic's Celtic
Tiger continues to expand, Northern Ireland's Ministers and citizens should see increasing benefits from North/South cooperation. In addition, as the European Union continues to integrate,
there will be pressure for both parts of Ireland to cooperate.
This pressure comes from their shared peripheral geographical
position, similar interests in functional activities such as agriculture and tourism, and in having regions defined in, ways that attract funds.1 8
B. The British-Irish Confederal Relationship
There is a second, weaker confederal relationship established by the Agreement that affects all the islands of Britain and
Ireland. Under the new British-Irish Council the two sovereign
Governments, all the devolved governments of the United Kingdom, and all the neighboring insular dependent territories of
the United Kingdom, can meet and agree to delegate functions.
They may also agree on common policies. This proposal meets
unionists' concerns for reciprocity in linkages and provides a
mechanism through which they may in the future be linked to
the United Kingdom even though Northern Ireland has become
part of the Republic of Ireland.
Unionists originally wanted any North/South Ministerial
Council to be subordinate to a British-Irish, or East-West, Council. This has not happened. There is no hierarchical relationship between the two Councils. Indeed, there are two textual
warrants for the thesis that the North/South Ministerial Council
is more important and far-reaching than its British-Irish counterpart. The Agreement requires the establishment of North/
South implementation bodies, while leaving the formation of
East-West bodies a voluntary matter. While the Agreement states
explicitly that the Assembly and the North/South Ministerial
Council cannot survive without the other, it makes no equivalent
statement concerning the British-Irish Council.
The development of this confederal relationship may be
18. Northern Ireland could, in principle, even go into Economic and Monetary
Union ("EMU") with the Republic, if Britain itself remained outside, providing there
was agreement in the Assembly and the Secretary of State and the Westminster Parliament assented.
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stunted by an Irish Governmental reluctance to engage in a forum where it may be outnumbered by at least seven other governments, including the governments of Westminster, Scotland,
Wales, Northern Ireland, Jersey, Guernsey, and the Isle of Man.
The development of this relationships may be stunted even
though rules may develop to ensure the joint dominance of the
sovereign governments. The British-Irish Council, however, may
flourish as a policy formulation forum if the devolved governments of the United Kingdom choose to exploit it as an opportunity for intergovernmental bargaining within the United Kingdom, or to build alliances with the Irish Government on European public policy, in which case it will give added impetus to
other federalist processes.
C. A United Kingdom-Northern Irish FederalizingProcess
The Agreement is the penultimate blow to unitary Unionism in the United Kingdom, a political persuasion already
dented by the 1997-1998 referendums and legislative acts establishing a Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly. 19 Does the
Agreement simply fall within the rubric of devolution within a
decentralized unitary state? Arguably not. Two Unions make up
the United Kingdom-the Union of Great Britain and the
Union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The constitutional basis of the latter union is now distinctly different than the
former.
The Agreement is a treaty between two states and it is based
on Irish national self-determination as well as British constitutional convention. The United Kingdom officially acknowledges
in the Agreement that Northern Ireland has the right to secede
into the Republic on the basis of a local referendum. The
United Kingdom also recognizes in a treaty the authority of Irish
national self-determination throughout the island of Ireland.
Moreover, the Agreement's institutions are being created by
the will of the people of Ireland, North and South, and not just
by the people of Northern Ireland, considering the interdependence of the North/South Ministerial Council and the Assembly. Consequently, the United Kingdom's relationship to Northern Ireland regarding international law is explicitly federal because the Westminster parliament and executive, except
19. The formation of an English Parliament would be the last blow.
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through breaking its treaty obligations and denying Irish national self-determination, cannot exercise power in any manner
in Northern Ireland that is inconsistent with the Agreement.
This federalizing process will be enhanced if the United
Kingdom and Northern Irish courts treat Northern Ireland's relationships to Westminster as akin to those of the former Dominions, which had a federal character, as they did in the period of
the Stormont Parliament (1921-1972). Moreover, the nature of
devolution in Northern Ireland is not closed by the United Kingdom's Northern Ireland Act of 1998. The Act has created an
open-ended mechanism for Northern Ireland to expand its autonomy from the rest of the United Kingdom, albeit with the
consent of the Secretary of State and the approval of Westminster. No such open-ended provision has been granted to the
Scottish Parliament or the Welsh Assembly. In short, Northern
Ireland can gain maximum autonomy while remaining within
the Union provided that there is agreement within the Northern
Assembly. Legalist Diceyians may insist that Westminster's sovereignty in Northern Ireland remains ultimately intact. If, however, the Agreement beds down the political development of a
federal relationship between the United Kingdom and Northern
Ireland, then it is assured for the near future whatever might be
said in the dry recesses of the Constitution's ancient regime.
D. Irish FederalizingProcesses
The Agreement opens federalist avenues in the Republic of
Ireland, hitherto one of the most centralized states in Europe.
The North/South Ministerial Council is seen by nationalists,
North and South, as the embryonic institution of a federal Ireland. Nationalists consider that a confederation must be built
first, and then, after trust has been established, a federation
should be created. This stepping stone theory is articulated
most emphatically by "No" Unionists. These "No" Unionists are
not wrong in their calculation that many nationalists see the
North/South Ministerial Council as transitional. Sinn F6in says
so, and does Fianna Fail.
The Irish Government and its people did not abandon Irish
unification when they endorsed the Agreement. Indeed, it has
become, in the words of the new provisional Article 3 of the Irish
Constitution:
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the firm will of the Irish nation, in harmony and friendship,
to unite all the people who share the territory of the island of
Ireland, in all the diversity of their identities and traditions,
recognising that a united Ireland shall be brought about only
by peaceful means with the consent of a majority of the people expressed, in both jurisdictions in the island.2 °
The amended Irish Constitution, therefore, officially recognizes
two jurisdictions that jointly enjoy the right to participate in the
Irish nation's exercise of self-determination. Unification is no
longer linked to unitarism and is entirely compatible with either
full confederation or federation.
Irish unification cannot be precluded because of present
demographic and electoral trends, which have led to a steady
rise in the nationalist share of the vote across different electoral
systems. 2 1 The nature of any eventual unification envisaged in
the redrafted Irish Constitution is now very different. It no
longer provides for anything resembling a program of assimilation. Respect for the diversity of identities and traditions connects with both consociational and con/federal logic. This author maintains that the Republic is bound by the Agreement to
structure its laws and its protection of rights in order to prepare
for the possibility of a con/federal as well as a unitary Ireland.
The Agreement recognizes Northern Ireland as a legal entity within the Irish Constitution. 22 Its ultimate status as a political unit is no longer a programmatic feature of Bunreacht na
Eireann. The Agreement also envisages the subjection of both
jurisdictions in Ireland to the same regime for the protection of
individual and group rights, a situation entirely compatible with
a subsequent formal confederation or federation.
It is perhaps worth speculating on what might happen if a
majority emerged for Irish unification within Northern Ireland.
If nationalists acquired local majority support within Northern
Ireland, it would not necessarily be in their considered interests
to promote the region's immediate administrative and legal assimilation into the Republic. Nationalists would then have an
20. IR. CONST. art. 3 (1937).

21. SeeJoHN McGARRY & BRENDAN O'LEARY, EXPLAINING NORTHERN IRELAND: BROKEN IMAGES ch. 10 (1995); see also Brendan O'Leary & Geoffrey Evans, Northern Ireland:
La Fin de Siecle, the Twilight of the Second ProtestantAscendancy and Sinn Fin'sSecond Coming, in PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS 672-80 (1997).

22.

IR. CONST.
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interest in preserving Northern Ireland as a political entity
within a federated Ireland. They would after all be a local majority, as would the governing coalition in the Republic whose calculations might be disturbed by the entry of Northern participants. Conversely, some unionists faced with this prospect might
prefer a unitary Ireland as the lesser evil, calculating that their
chances of being key players in government formation in a bigger arena might protect them better than being a minority in
Northern Ireland.
Meanwhile we all know that the con/federal dimensions of
the Agreement are not merely pan-Irish or pan-British. They will
evolve within a European Union, which has its own strong confederal relationships, as well as many ambitious federalists.
There will be no obvious organizational contradictions that will
arise from this extra layer of con/federalizing, and they might
help to transfer some of the heat from binary considerations of
whether a given issue is controlled by London or Dublin.
V. DOUBLE PROTECTION AND CO-SOVEREIGNTY
The subtlest part of the Agreement, its tacit double protection model, goes well beyond standard consociational thinking
and is laced with elements of co-sovereignty. The Agreement is
designed to withstand major demographic and electoral change.
It promises to entrench the identical protection of rights, collective and individual, on both sides of the present border. In effect, it promises protection to Northern nationalists now on the
same terms that will be given to Ulster unionists should they ever
become a minority in a unified Ireland. Communities are to be
protected whether they are majorities or minorities, and
whether sovereignty lies with the United Kingdom or the Republic, hence, the expression double protection.
The two states not only promise reciprocity for the local
protection of present and future minorities, but also have created two intergovernmental devices to protect those communities. One such a device is the successor to the Anglo-Irish Agreement, the intergovernmental conference that guarantees the Republic's government access to policy formulation on all matters
not yet devolved to the Northern Assembly or the North/South
Ministerial Council. The other device is the British-Irish Council. If Irish unification ever occurs, then the Republic's govern-
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ment would find it politically impossible not to offer the British
government reciprocal access in the same forums.
It is important to note what has not happened between the
two sovereign governments. Formal co-sovereignty has not been
established. Unionists claim that they have removed the 1985
Anglo-Irish Agreement in return for conceding a North/South
Ministerial Council. This claim is, at best, exaggerated. Under
the new Agreement, the Irish government will retain say in those
Northern Irish matters that have not been devolved to the
Northern Assembly, as was the case under Article 4 of the AngloIrish Agreement. 23 As with that agreement, there will continue
to be an intergovernmental conference, chaired by the Minister
for Foreign Affairs and the Northern Ireland Secretary of State,
to deal with non-devolved matters. This conference will continue to be serviced by a standing secretariat.
The new Agreement, moreover, promises to intensify cooperation between the two governments on all-island or cross-border aspects of rights, justice, prison, and policing, unless and until these matters are devolved to the Northern executive. There
are provisions for representatives of the Northern Assembly to
be involved in the intergovernmental conference, which would
signify a welcome proclivity for democratization. The AngloIrish Agreement fully anticipated these arrangements. 24 Therefore, it is more accurate to claim that the Anglo-Irish Agreement
has been fulfilled than it is to say that it has been removed.
VI. THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL NATURE OF
THE A GREEMENT
The institutional nature of the Agreement is complex, but it
accurately matches the conceptual categories that I have
deployed. There is no need to use new terms for what has already been agreed on, except, perhaps, for what I have called
the double protection model. The Agreement is wide-ranging,
multilateral, and has something in it for everyone who signed it.
Its institutions address the totality of relationships between nationalists and unionists in Northern Ireland, between Northern
Ireland and the Republic, and between Ireland and Britain. It is
23. Anglo-Irish Agreement, supra note 3, art. 4.
24. See BRENDAN O'LEARY &JOHN McGARRY, THE
STANDING NORTHERN IRELAND chs. 6-7 (2d ed. 1996).
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neither a victory for nationalists, nor for unionists. Both can
maintain their central aspirations, their core identities, and protect or express better their interests. While describing constitutional architecture is one thing, informal political reality is often
very different.
The Agreement may be an immensely subtle institutional
construction, but everyone asks, "Is it a pack of cards, vulnerable
to the slightest pressures?" "Is it vulnerable to the play of either
Orange or Green cards by hard-line loyalists or republicans, or
to miscalculations by softer-line politicians?" "Will its successful
implementation prove more difficult than its formulation?"
These are hardly foolish concerns, as revealed by the fracas
at Drumcree 4 in July, the massacre at Omagh in August, and the
continuing crisis over executive formation and decommissioning. There are, however, reasons to be cheerful about the robustness of these institutions if we analyze the military and political nature of the settlement. There are also reasons to be cautious.
A. The Agreement on Ending the Armed Conflict
The Agreement is a political settlement that promises a path
to unwind armed conflict and to create a peace settlement. Formally speaking, however, no military or paramilitary organizations negotiated the Agreement. The Agreement encompasses
decommissioning, de-militarization, police reform, and prisoner
release. It addresses these issues in this textual order, and it is
plain that though all these issues are inter-linked, they are not
explicitly tied to the construction or timing of the new political
institutions.
1. Decommissioning
The Agreement is clear on decommissioning.
No
paramilitaries that abide by the Agreement have to engage in
formal surrender to those they opposed in war. The Independent International Commission on Decommissioning, chaired by
Canadian General John de Chastelain, is to assist the participants in achieving the total disarmament of all paramilitary organizations. The parties that informally represented paramilitary
organizations in the negotiations are required to "use any influence they may have, to achieve the decommissioning of all
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paramilitary arms within two years following endorsement in refand in the context of
erendums North and South of the agreement
' 25
the implementation of the overall settlement.
The emphasized passages clarify the termination point for
decommissioning, not the moment of commencement. The
passages also make it clear that decommissioning is linked to the
implementation of the overall settlement, including the establishment of the North, North/South, and East-West governance
structures, and to police reform. That is why David Trimble's
demand that Sinn Fain achieve a start to decommissioning by
the IRA before executive formation in the North is regarded as a
breach of any reasonable interpretation of the text of the Agreement. Without executive formation in the North, none of the
formal institutions of the Agreement that require the cooperation of the local parties can get underway.
Sinn Fain has nominated a representative to the International Commission. It has issued a statement effectually stating
that the war is over. For the first time it has issued an outright
condemnation of other republicans, namely the Real IRA whose
members carried out the Omagh bombing. It is even assisting
ETA in its organization of a ceasefire and political negotiations
in Spain. Evidently, David Trimble and some of his senior colleagues are unprepared to regard this activity as sufficient evidence of good intentions. Each move on Sinn Fein's part has
merely led the UUP to request more. On the basis of current
postures, only one obvious resolution of this crisis presents itself,
namely that executive formation should be announced in the
morning, and material progress on decommissioning should be
announced in the afternoon.
2. De-militarization, Police Reform, and Prisoner Release
The Agreement promises, and the United Kingdom government has begun, a series of phased developments to de-militarize Northern Ireland. Normalization is explicitly promised.
The Agreement promises reductions in army deployments and
quantity, as well as the removal of security installations and
emergency powers. The Agreement also addresses personal firearms regulation and control, as an extraordinary proportion of
Northern Ireland's citizens, mostly Protestants and unionists,
25. Agreement, supra note 2, Decommissioning

3 (emphasis added).
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26
have legally-held lethal weapons.
Police reform is addressed in the Agreement through an Independent Commission,2 7 which must provide a report by the
summer of 1999. The terms of reference of the Independent
Commission require that the commission propose how to establish a police service that is representative, routinely unarmed,
professional, effective and efficient, fair and impartial, free from
partisan political control, accountable,, and conforms with
human rights norms. 28 This commission is to report a year
before decommissioning is finished. It is difficult to believe that
the choice of timing on the part of the makers of the Agreement
was an accident. Plainly, the public outline of police reform was
to be available as a confidence-building measure for nationalists
before the major part of republican decommissioning could be
expected. Bringing forward this outline fast might be one way to
resolve the crisis of executive formation, though the necessary
radicalism will be difficult for David Trimble and his colleagues
to swallow.
The early release of paramilitary prisoners sentenced under
scheduled offenses, and of a small number of army personnel
imprisoned for murders of civilians, has proceeded with less disruption than might have been anticipated. Measures to assist
the victims of violence have helped ease the pain occasioned in
some quarters by these early releases. The early release scheme
has also worked in creating incentives for such ultra-paramilitary
organizations as the Loyalist Volunteer Force to agree to a ceasefire in order to benefit their prisoners.

B. The Political Nature of the Agreement
There is, then, agreement on how to unwind the military
and paramilitary conflict. Movement is taking place on some
dimensions but not on others. Before We address the obstacles
to a final resolution, let us briefly examine the political nature of
the Agreement. The Agreement is based on multiple forms of
recognition, including recognition of the balance of power. It is
an act of statecraft, but it is also based on hard-headed calculations rather than irreverent sentiments.
26. Id., Security
1-4.
27. See McGARRY & O'LF-ARV, supra note 13.
28. Agreement, supra note 2, Policing and Justice,

1-2.
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1. Recognition
The Agreement is an act of recognition between states and
national communities. The Republic of Ireland has recognized
Northern Ireland's status as part of the United Kingdom, subject
to the implementation of the Agreement. The United Kingdom
has recognized the right of the people of Ireland to exercise
their national self-determination, albeit conjointly and severally.
It has confirmed that Northern Ireland has the right to secede,
by majority consent, to unify with the Republic of Ireland. The
Republic of Ireland has recognized unionists' British political
identity. The United Kingdom has recognized Northern nationalists as a national minority, not simply as a cultural or religious
minority, and as part of a possible future Irish national majority.
The two states have recognized the paramilitaries that have organised cease-fires as political agencies. The Agreement has not
required them to surrender to their respective authorities and
has accepted the release of their prisoners on the assurance that
their organizations will participate in ceasefires. The paramilitaries have, with some minor exceptions, recognized one another
when it comes to ceasefires.
Unionists have recognized nationalists as nationalists, not
simply as Catholics or as the minority. Nationalists have recognized Unionists as unionists, and notjust as Protestants. Nationalists and unionists have recognized others who are neither nationalists nor unionists. This bounty of recognition in contemporary Northern Ireland would warm the cockles of Hegel's and
Charles Taylor's hearts.2 9 The identity dimension of the conflict
that John Whyte emphasized is undoubtedly being addressed.
2. Balance of Power
The Agreement also rests on recognition of a balance of
power. The Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 led to a new but ultimately productive stalemate. Republicans were left with no immediate prospect of significant electoral growth and their military capacity to sicken the British proved limited.
Loyalists re-organized in the late 1980s and by the early
29. For sophisticated discussions of recognition, see, for example, ERIK RINGMAR,
A CULTURAL EXPLANATION OF SWEDEN'S INTERVENTION
IN THE THIRTY YEARS WAR (1996), and CHARLES TAYLOR, MULTICULTURALISM AND THE
POLITICS OF RECOGNITION (1992).
IDENTITY, INTEREST AND ACTION:
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1990s were able to raise the costs of sustaining violence within
the republican constituency. Unionists discovered the limits of
just saying no as British or bi-governmental initiatives were created over their heads. There was a military stalemate and a political stalemate, but there were also underground structural
changes beneath the "frozen surface" that were noted by John
Whyte in his last essay.3 ° These changes included greater equality of opportunity and self-confidence among nationalists, as well
as a shift in the demographic and a resulting shift in the electoral balance of power within the communities. Together these
changes underlined the fact that any political settlement could
not return nationalists to a subordinate status. The initiative of
John Hume and Gerry Adams constructively responded to this
new stalemate. Much work had to be done before their initiative
bore fruit.
3. The Bargain
There is a bargain at the heart of the Agreement. Nationalists have endorsed it because it promises them political, legal,
and economic equality now, plus institutions in which they have
a strong stake, with the possibility of Irish unification later. The
Agreement provides that Nationalists co-govern Northern Ireland, rather than their being governed by either unionists or the
British government. Moreover, they get promises of further reforms to redress past legacies of direct and indirect discrimination. Republicans in Sinn Fain and the IRA can trade a long war
that they could not win or lose for a long march through institutions in which they can reasonably claim that only their means
have changed, not their end, the termination of partition.
Nationalist support for the Agreement is not difficult to
comprehend. For Nationalists, it is a satisfactory bet either way.
Why, then, did the UUP and the loyalist parties make this consociational pact with the nationalist devil? The charms and latent
threats of Tony Blair and Bill Clinton, the diplomacy of George
Mitchell, and the process of multi-party inclusive negotiations
are not enough to account for David Trimble's decision to lead
30. John Whyte, Dynamics of Politicaland Social Change in NorthernIreland, in NORTH103-16 (Dermot Keogh & Michael
Haltzel eds., 1993).
ERN IRELAND AND THE POLITICS OF RECONCILIATION
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his party where it was most reluctant to go, nor do these factors
allow for his intelligence.
In this author's judgment, the unionists who supported the
Agreement were concerned not so much with ending the IRA's
long war. Rather, they were concerned with protecting and safeguarding the Union. Their calculi suggest that only by being
generous now could they reconcile nationalists to the Union and
protect themselves against possible seismic shifts in the balance
of demographic power. Unionists would get a share in self-government now, avoid the prospect of a British Government making further deals over their heads with the Irish State, and have
some prospect of persuading northern nationalists that a newly
reconstructed Union offers a secure home for them. They made
an Agreement to stave off something worse.
4. Ideas
Recognizing identities and interests are necessary but not
sufficient conditions of a constitutional settlement. Ideas, however loosely understood or flexibly deployed, were also important in the making of the Agreement. Their development, dissemination, and impact is harder to trace, but that does not
mean the task cannot be accomplished. Fresh language and policy learning were evident in the making of the Agreement. Policy obstinacy and recalcitrance within the highest echelons of
the dying Major government and of the spread-eagled rainbow
coalition in Dublin between 1995 and 1997 were also evident.
The crafters of the ideas were many and varied, including
politicians, public officials, and many unofficial advisors. Defining the sources of the conflict in national terms, rather than as
issuing from religious extremism or terrorism, was vital. Without
this shift, the. Anglo-Irish Agreement, the Framework Documents, and the Agreement itself would not have been possible.
The end of the Cold War and political change in South Africa
and the Middle East registered in and effected the region. The
traditional explanations of the causes of the conflict had increasingly ceased to move the local participants. Many were open to
compromises and political institutions that would mark a shift
from the limitations of either London's or Dublin's conceptions
of good governance.
The beauty of the Agreement as a, bargain is that both na-
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tionalists and unionists have sound reasons for their respective
assessments of its merits, namely for believing that they are right
about the long term. They cannot be certain that they are right,
and so they are willing to make this elaborate settlement now.
Does Yeats' phrase, "a terrible beauty," apply here? Will the
Agreement wither and die once it has become apparent who is
right about the long term? That possibility cannot be excluded,
but that is why the Agreement's architecture repays careful inspection. It is not a consociational model, like the model in Lebanon, that is vulnerable to the slightest demographic transformation in the make-up of its constituent communities.
There are incentives for each bloc to accommodate the
other precisely in order to make its vision of the future more
likely. For example, both have reasons to act creatively on the
basis of self-fulfilling prophecies. The benefit of the double protection model is that it eases the pain for whoever gets it wrong
about the future. The confederalizing and federalizing possibilities in the Agreement ensure that both national communities
will remain linked, come what may, to their preferred nationstates. Moreover, the Agreement does not preclude the parties
agreeing at some future juncture to a fully-fledged model of British and Irish co-sovereignty in and over Northern Ireland.
There will, of course, be difficulties ahead, but Northern
Ireland has a new, if slightly precarious and slightly unbalanced,
bi-national super-majority. The Assembly and its Executive Committee are workable, and they can become mechanisms for accommodating the diverse peoples of the North. There will be
difficulties in agreeing on a budget and a broad program of government, and die-hards or kill-hards will be hoping to capitalize
on them. Managing the twilight of the second Protestant ascendancy in Irish history and the re-rustication of militant republicanism are not easy tasks, but the Agreement may deliver many
impossibilities before its first birthday.
VII. THE SHORT-TERM POLITICS OF THE TRANSITION
A COUNSEL ON THE GAMES OF UNLIKELY PARTNERS
AND THE TEMPTATIONS OF LEGALISM
Before the optimistic picture can materialize, much work remains to be done. The Agreement's political entrenchment requires that some short-term advantage-maximizing and game-
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playing temptations be avoided. At the heart of this Agreement
lie four internal political forces-the SDLP, the UUP, Sinn Fain,
and the PUP/UDP.3 1 The SDLP and the UUP comprise the historically moderate nationalists, while Sinn Fain and the PUP/
UDP are the more moderate republicans and loyalists. Maintaining the Agreement requires that these political forces evolve as
informal coalition partners while preserving their bases. Considerations of brevity oblige this author to focus on just two of these
constellations.
The UUP is the most likely short-term maximizer and gameplayer. The party split most under the impact of the making of
the Agreement. It lost votes to the "No" Unionists, and it has
lost some further dissenters that were elected on its platform.
The temptation of its leaders is to renegotiate the Agreement in
the course of its implementation. That way they can hope to
refortify the party and draw off support from the soft-"No" camp
amongst unionists.
The UUP would have preferred an Agreement that was
largely internal to Northern Ireland. It also would have preferred an Agreement that provided for their co-governing
Northern Ireland with the SDLP. It would strongly prefer to govern Northern Ireland without the formal participation of Sinn
Fiin. Consequently, the UUP's most tempting game plan is to
use the decommissioning issue to split what their supporters see
as a pan-nationalist bloc. If they achieve decommissioning, then
they assume that they will split the republican base of Sinn Fin,
and they can live with that. If they do not achieve decommissioning, they may think that they can sabotage the more radical
agenda of the Agreement if they can retain British support on
the issue of decommissioning. The temptation of the UUP is
towards post-Agreement negotiation, motivated by an opportunism aggravated by perceived political weakness. The signs of
this game will be a phony legalism, an adversarial and pettyminded interpretation of the Agreement, postponement and
prevarication, and brinkmanship. These signs may appear familiar.
31. In the new dispensation there are now eight minorities. Five support the
Agreement: nationalists, republicans, yes unionists, yes loyalists, and others. Three are
against the Agreement: no unionists, no loyalists, and no republicans. The latter are in
objective alliance.
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The other constellation is republican. Republicans may be
tempted to engage in game-playing of a different kind. They
can and may insist on the full letter of the Agreement to sustain
their constituency and their long-term political strategy, even if
this insistence creates great difficulties for the UUP and the
SDLP, their informal partners. They may think that they have an
each way bet. If the UUP delivers on the Agreement, well and
good. If the UUP does not deliver, then Sinn Fain will position
itself to ensure that unionists are blamed for its non-implementation.
For hard-liners, non-implementation of the Agreement may
provide a pretext for a return to war. In contrast, softer-liners
will argue that any return to violence could only be sanctioned if
governmental or loyalist forces were responsible. Many softerliners would argue that Sinn F~in would have more to gain
electorally both within Northern Ireland and the Republic
through remaining a wholly constitutional opposition to a defunct Agreement. Sinn Fain may ironically be tempted by hard
legalism, extracting the full letter of its contract with the UUP at
the risk of damaging the informal political coalition that made
the Agreement.
CONCLUSION
Three things must happen in order for this consociational
and con/federal Agreement to survive. Immediate, daily, vigorous, and continuing British and Irish oversight is required to encourage the Agreement's fulsome implementation before the
looming prospect of a constitutional time bomb in a Dublin
court. The governments must use all their available tools, from
rhetorical appeals to politicians' salaries and expenses in order
to reach this end.
The Agreement also requires an immediate end to the
Northern Ireland Office's new meta-administrative principle
that any disagreement over the meaning of the Agreement and
its accompanying legislation must be subject to cross-community
consent procedures, an incredible invitation to legalism on the
part of parties tempted to re-negotiate the Agreement continually. The Agreement also requires greater recognition among
the informal coalition partners, especially within the UUP and
Sinn F6in, that they may benefit more in the long run from not
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seeking maximum short-term advantage from one another's difficulties and from not over-hyping their own. They should reflect on the fact that a Northern Assembly election is not required before 2002.
The benefits of these requirements will be demonstrated if
two crises are resolved. One is the present crisis linking decommissioning and executive formation. The other is the widely anticipated future crisis over police reform. If they are not resolved, we will have a constitutional and policy mess that will require all the patience and national and religious ecumenism of
another John Whyte to interpret. I hope that this will not be
necessary, not least because there will never be another John
Whyte.

1999]

THE NATURE OF THE AGREEMENT

1661

APPENDIX ONE: HOW WILL THE ASSEMBLY AND ITS
CROSS-COMMUNITY VOTING RULES WORK?
The Assembly and its Executive will have full legislative and
executive competence for economic development, education,
health and social services, agriculture, environment, and finance
(including the Northern Ireland civil service). Through agreement the Assembly is able to expand these functions; and, again
through agreement, and with the consent of the Secretary of
State and the Westminster Parliament, the Assembly may legislate for any non-devolved function. So, if the Assembly works
well, then maximum feasible devolved self-government is possible and a convention might arise in which the Secretary of State
and Westminster "rubber stamp" legislative measures coming
from the Assembly. The road is open to one in which public
policy in Ireland, North and South, is made without direct British ministerial involvement-though the British budgetary allocation will continue to be pivotal as long as Northern Ireland
remains in the United Kingdom.
Assembly members have to designate themselves as nationalist, unionist, or "Other." This ruling poses difficult questions
for the Alliance and other "cross-community" parties, such as the
Northern Ireland Women's Coalition. If they choose to register
as unionist, then they increase the number of moderate unionists in the Assembly, but with the attendant risk that they may
lose the support of some Catholic voters. If they choose to designate themselves as "Other," then they may, by contrast, weaken
their power in critical votes in the Assembly and run the risk of
losing the support of some Protestant voters. In this Assembly
they have determined that they are "Other," though they are
free to change their classifications in the future.
The Assembly through majority rule passes "normal laws,"
though there is provision for a minority, of thirty of the 108 Assembly members, to trigger special procedures. But "key decisions," that is the passage of controversial legislation, including
the budget, automatically have these special procedures that require "cross-community" support. Two rules have been
designed.
The first is "parallel consent." This requires, among those
present and voting, both an overall majority of Assembly members and a majority of both unionist and nationalist members to
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endorse a proposal. Table Two, which records the numbers in
each bloc returned in the June 1998 election, suggests that parallel consent with all members present, will require the support of
twenty-two nationalists and twenty-nine unionists, as well as an
overall majority in the Assembly.
The second rule is that of "weighted majority." This requires, among those present and voting, support from sixty percent of members, i.e., sixty-five members when all members vote,
or sixty-four excluding the Speaker. It also requires the support
of forty percent of nationalist members and forty percent of
unionist members. The data in Table Two suggest that at least
seventeen nationalists must consent under this procedure, and
at least twenty-four unionists. It also suggests that all nationalists
(42) and the minimum necessary number of unionists (24) have
the necessary combined support in the Assembly as a whole for
any measure passed in this way (65). The same figures strongly
suggest that in the first new Assembly moderate pro-Agreement
unionists are vulnerable to pressure from anti-Agreement unionists. They could even refuse to be part of a predominantly nationalist super-majority necessary to work the parallel consent
rule. But there is fat built into the Assembly. The bottom line is
that David Trimble can survive and deliver a workable portion of
the new cross-community majority even with six dissidents in his
own party-providing he can be certain of the support of the
PUP (which is likely), and providing that he can live with support from Sinn Fain (which is evidently much more uncomfortable for him).
The cross-community rules are vital but not entirely predictable in their consequences. The legislation implies that the parallel consent procedure must be attempted first, and then the
weighted majority procedure can be followed. That, however,
may have to be clarified when the transitional Assembly decides
its rules of procedure-by cross-community consent! The operation of the cross-community rules depends not just on how parties register, but also on how disciplined parties are within the
Assembly-the widespread fears that have been expressed about
the discipline and unity of the UUP reflect knowledge of this
fact.
The Assembly will have committees scrutinizing each of the
departments headed by Ministers. Committee Chairs and Deputy Chairs will also be allocated according to the d'Hondt rule
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(see Appendix Two). Each committee will have to approve any
proposed new law within its jurisdiction tabled by Ministers, and
indeed the committee can initiate legislative proposals. In consequence, a committee dominated by other parties may block
the legislative initiatives of a dynamic Minister, and it may initiate legislation not to that Minister's liking-though the success
of such proposals are subject to the possibility of cross-community special procedures!
APPENDIX TWO: THE MYSTERIOUS WORK OF
VIKTOR D'HONDT IN BELFAST
Viktor d'Hondt is the best answer to the Trivial Pursuit challenge to name a famous Belgian. He was a mathematician who
devised a proportional method that is used for many purposes,
including allocating political offices according to the shares of
seats held by parties in the European Parliament. The method
works by iteration, using a simple series of divisors, 1, 2, 3, etc.
Rules like this are needed because assembly-persons do not
come in convenient fractions. The table below shows how the
allocation works, assuming parties have the seats displayed in Table Two and assuming all parties are willing and entitled to take
their seats. The party with the largest number of seats, the UUP,
must get the first Ministry, and then its seat share would then be
divided by a two seat-share. We then look for the next largest
number of seats, held by the SDLP, and they get the second Ministry.
In Table Three, ten Ministries are allocated. The numbers
in square brackets in the M columns indicate the order in which
parties win Ministries of their choice, whereas S is the number of
seats each party has during each stage of the allocation.
In this scenario, unionists are entitled to five Ministries (3
UUP and 2 DUP), while nationalists are entitled to five (3 SDLP
and 2 SF). If, by contrast, the First Minister and Deputy First
Minister decide that there should only be six Ministries, then
unionists would have three (2 UUP, 1 DUP) and nationalists
would have three (2 SDLP and 1 SF). If they opted for seven,
the UUP's current negotiating preference, then there would be
four unionist Ministries and three for the nationalists.
What happens if the DUP does not take its Ministries because it will not accept the obligations of office? If there are to
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be ten Ministries, then the UUP would win one more Ministry
and the Alliance would win a Ministry. Nationalists would keep
the same number of Ministries as before, but would improve
their position in the pecking order. For example, their choice of
ministries would be improved. If, by contrast, there are to be six
Ministries, then unionists would have three Ministries (all UUP),
whereas Nationalists would have three (2 SDLP and 1 SF) but
with an improved pecking order.
There is only one important ambiguity in the Agreement
about how the d'Hondt rule will operate. Two possibilities exist.
Either the First and Deputy First Ministers count as part of the
allocation of Ministers, or they do not. If they do count, then in
the examples above UUP would start the allocation with twentyseven seats and the SDLP with twenty-three. In some possible
scenarios this method would have the important consequence of
helping other parties. But if they do not count, as I think is the
most reasonable reading of the text, then allocations would proceed as in the above examples.
The d'Hondt rule is also to be used to allocate Committee
Chairs and Deputy Chairs. It would be fair to do so with the
figures resulting from the subtraction of Ministers from parties'
seats in the Assembly, but the Agreement is not clear on this. It
is also not clear if the d'Hondt rule will be used to allocate all
committee places. I am assuming that that will happen-in
which case some committees may not have unionist majorities.
The UUP and the SDLP have provisionally agreed on the
creation of junior ministers, presumably to be allocated places
on the d'Hondt rule. If so, then every major pro-Agreement
party will have most of its members having prizes of one sort or
another-something that can only assist the cementing of the
Agreement-and will provide incentives for a shift of posture on
the part of ambitious anti-Agreement assembly members. It will
also mean that the new Assembly is likely to have a rather small
part of its membership free for standard adversarial parliamentary debating in the classical Westminster mould. Perhaps that is
also to the good.
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Table One: The Shares of Blocs in the 1998 Assembly
(*Percentages do not add up to 100 because of rounding)
FIRST

PREFERENCE
BLOC

SEATS WON

VOTE (%)

SEATS
WON (%)

Nationalists

42

39.8

38.8

'Yes" Unionists

30

25.0

27.7

"No" Unionists

28

25.5

25.9

8

9.4

7.4

108

*100

*100

Others
Total(s)

Table Two: Party Performances in a 1998 Assembly Election
(*Percentages do not add up to 100 because of rounding)
FIRST
SEATS

PREFERENCE
VOTE (%)

WON (%)

PARTY

SEATS WON

SDLP

24

22.0

22.2

Sinn Fain

18

17.7

16.6

Other Nationalists

.1

_

UUP

28

21.0

25.9

PUP

2

2.5

1.8

UDP

-

1.2

Other "Yes" Unionists

-

0.3

20

18.0

18.5

UKUP

5

4.5

4.6

Other "No" Unionists

3

3.0

2.8

Alliance

6

6.4

5.5

Women's Coalition

2

1.7

1.9

Others

-

1.3

DUP

_
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